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Detecting agency from the biological motion
of veridical vs animated agents
Raymond A. Mar,1 William M. Kelley,2 Todd F. Heatherton,2 and C. Neil Macrae2,3
1York University, Department of Psychology Brain Sciences Building 4700, Keele St, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3, 2Department of
Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Moore Hall, Hanover NH 03755, USA, and 3School of Psychology, University of
Aberdeen, King’s College, Aberdeen AB24 2UB, Scotland, UK
The ability to detect agency is fundamental for understanding the social world. Underlying this capacity are neural circuits that
respond to patterns of intentional biological motion in the superior temporal sulcus and temporoparietal junction. Here we show
that the brain’s blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response to such motion is modulated by the representation of the
actor. Dynamic social interactions were portrayed by either live-action agents or computer-animated agents, enacting the exact
same patterns of biological motion. Using an event-related design, we found that the BOLD response associated with the
perception and interpretation of agency was greater when identical physical movements were performed by real rather than
animated agents. This finding has important implications for previous work on biological motion that has relied upon computer-
animated stimuli and demonstrates that the neural substrates of social perception are finely tuned toward real-world agents.
In addition, the response in lateral temporal areas was observed in the absence of instructions to make mental inferences,
thus demonstrating the spontaneous implementation of the intentional stance.
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PERCEIVING AND UNDERSTANDING THE ACTIONS OF
INTENTIONAL AGENTS, BOTH REAL AND ABSTRACT
Central to successful daily functioning is the ability to
identify, understand and respond to other autonomous
agents (Frith and Frith, 1999, 2001; Gallagher and Frith,
2003). From relatively simple perceptual cues, people can
readily compute the complex motives and intentions that
guide the behavior of others (Fletcher et al., 1995; Castelli
et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000; Pelphrey et al., 2003a;
Shultz et al., 2004). This effortless adoption of what has
been termed the ‘intentional stance’ is a pivotal component of
social cognition (Dennet, 1987; Frith and Frith, 2003).
Prior to attributing intentions, however, people must first
discern the presence of agents. That is, they must parse
perceptual information into animate and inanimate cate-
gories and classify interactions between objects as mechanical
or intentional (Frith and Frith, 1999). For different patterns
of motion, critical distinctions are made between animate
movement (e.g. self-propelled, possibly non-human, motion)
and biological motion (e.g. movement of limbs, faces).
Whereas animate movement is characterized by mechanical
causation, biological motion reflects non-mechanical
contingency or causation at a distance (i.e. psychological
causation or intentional movement; Castelli et al., 2000).
Importantly, detecting agency from motion cues is believed
to be a critical precursor of mentalizing, the ability to
construe human behavior as intentional in nature (Scholl and
Tremoulet, 2000; Baldwin and Baird, 2001; Gallagher and
Frith, 2003). The perception of agency from such cues is often
immediate, effortless and automatic, thus distinguishable
from more complicated forms of social cognition such as
imputing motivations or making judgments regarding beliefs
(Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000).
Recent investigations of perceiving biological motion and
mentalizing have identified brain areas that are involved in
the explicit evaluation of moving objects, usually animated
cartoon characters or geometric shapes (Gallagher and Frith,
2003); these include the superior temporal sulcus (STS),
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporal-parietal
junction (TPJ). The presence of this mentalizing network
has also been demonstrated in a number of studies that
employed non-dynamic representations, such as stories
about others (Saxe and Powell, 2006; Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003), photographs of faces (Mitchell et al., 2005b), and
semantically presented trait and mental state information
(Mitchell et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 2005a). A parallel
though related stream of research related to the under-
standing of biological motion and intentional action has
focused on the pivotal role of the superior temporal sulcus,
confirmed by both single-cell recordings in macaques
(Jellema et al., 2000) and neuroimaging techniques in
humans (Allison et al., 2000; Pelphrey et al., 2004a;
Saxe et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2005).
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Studies that examine the mentalizing network typically
involve presenting abstract representations of social agents
(e.g. story characters, animated cartoon characters), and
asking participants to make a social judgment or mental
inference. While informative, this methodological strategy
nevertheless raises two interesting theoretical issues. First,
how are the neural substrates of elicited and explicit social
judgments related to the response that accompanies the
spontaneous (i.e. implicit) implementation of the intentional
stance? Second, the employment of abstract representations
(such as geometric shapes) begs the question of whether the
neural system that detects agency is sensitive to the form of
the cue provider (i.e. the moving agent)? Does it make
a difference if identical patterns of biological motion are
generated by real people or animated characters? Stated
differently, to what degree can research using abstract
shapes be generalized to real-world implementations of the
intentional stance? While we are certainly able to view
a wide variety of stimuli as intentional, the degree to which
this process reflects our everyday perception of conspecifics
is unclear. One previous investigation into this topic exists,
but the conclusions that can be drawn from it are limited
as the biological motion presented in the cartoon and
live-action conditions were not identical (Han et al., 2005).
Our own unique stimuli overcame this important problem.
METHODS
Matching cartoon and live-action actors
on biological motion
To address these questions, we used a unique set of stimuli
derived from the film Waking Life (Palotta and Linklater,
2001) and a paradigm in which no explicit judgments were
solicited. Originally shot with human actors, the footage of
Waking Life was transformed by computer animators into a
cartoon in which the motion of its characters is identically
matched to the original movie. We edited segments of the
original footage together with the relevant cartoon sequences
to create a video in which animated and live-action shots
were interleaved (Figures 1 and 2A). Importantly, each shot
was shown both in its animated and its live-action format,
thereby ensuring that subjects saw identical biological
movement in both conditions. The videos contained
29 different scenes (situations involving the same characters
and setting) that were each composed of between 1 and
15 shots (continuous footage between edits; 120 different
shots total) which alternated between live-action and ani-
mated versions. Alternation of the live-action and animated
shots within scenes was employed to prevent adaptation to
either of the presentation-types. Each shot included at least
one person within the frame, and scenes typically depicted
characters moving or engaging in social interaction.
Shots were on average 4.7 s (s.d.¼ 3.7, Range¼ 0.2318.9),
and scenes averaged 19.9 s (s.d.¼ 12.5, Range¼ 3.2–55.7).
Each scene was presented twice over the course of a single
block of presentations, and the alternation was mirrored,
so that if the first viewing began with a live-action shot
followed by an animated shot, the second viewing started
with an animated shot followed by a live-action shot
(Figure 1). A fixation cross was presented between
scenes, for either 4 (32 instances), 8 (17 instances) or
16 s (10 instances), with duration pseudo-randomly deter-
mined. Scenes were pseudo-randomly ordered so that no
scene was presented twice back-to-back and the alternation
was balanced so that scenes beginning with a live-action shot
Fig. 1 Example scene from stimuli movie in which real and cartoon shots were interleaved, creating two separate versions of the same scene that together presented identical
footage in both cartoon and live-action forms.
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were seen first half of the time; this controlled for adaptation
effects that may have occurred upon seeing the same
scene twice (cartoon or live-action presentation was not
confounded with second-viewings). Although the same
order of scenes was presented to all participants, cartoon
and live-action footage was evenly distributed across the
presentation block so order effects cannot account for
differences between the two stimulus types.
Participants were told to simply watch the videos closely;
unlike in most previous studies, no explicit instructions
to draw mental inferences were given.
Brain scanning methods, procedure, and analysis
A total of 19 participants (10 female) aged 17–43 years
(M¼ 22.1, s.d.¼ 6.2) passively viewed the video without
sound while undergoing fMRI scanning with a GE 1.5T MRI
scanner using a standard birdcage headcoil. A screening
process ensured that no participant had previously seen
Waking Life. T2-weighted functional images were collected
using a gradient echo EPI sequence (20 axial slices,
5.5mm thick, 1mm apart; TR¼ 2000ms; TE¼ 35ms;
flip angle¼ 908; FOV¼ 24 cm) during viewing. The stimuli
were presented in two runs, each run 410 volumes in length
(the first 5 volumes were discarded to ensure signal
equilibration). T1-weighted high-resolution anatomical
scans were also collected for each participant using a 3D
sequence (SPGR; 128 saggital slices, 1.2mm thick;
TR¼ 25ms; TE¼ 6ms; flip angle¼ 158; FOV¼ 24 cm).
All preprocessing and statistical analysis was performed
using SPM99 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
Functional images were corrected for motion, coregistered
to anatomical images, then both were normalized to
standardized Montre´al Neurological Institute (MNI)
space using the filT1 template, and smoothed using
a 6mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
Fig. 2 (A) Sample of video with real (red) and computer-generated (green) actors. (B) An inflated cortical representation of the right-hemisphere shows greater activation
for live-action than for animated sequences in the TPJ and STS. Greater activation for animated than for live-action sequences was observed in the lateral occipital cortex
(LOCC; see Table 2), and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). (C) Hemodynamic response function observed in the STS for live-action (red) and animated (green) sequences. The TPJ
showed a similar pattern of activation.
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Contrasts (t-tests) comparing blood oxygenation level
dependent (BOLD) responses for events time-locked to the
onset of realistic footage vs the onset of cartoon stimuli (and
vice versa) were calculated (P< 0.001, minimum cluster-size
of 5 voxels) for each individual, and a random-effects model
was applied to all contrasts in order to examine group-
level effects.
RESULTS
Social brain areas prefer live-action actors
to cartoon characters
Medial areas of occipital cortex (e.g. cuneus, lingual gyrus)
and subcortical sensory pathways (e.g. thalamus, caudate)
showed a greater BOLD response during viewing of real
scenes than during viewing of animated scenes
(Real >Animated contrast; Table 1). More interestingly,
however, the right STS and right TPJ also showed a greater
response during the live-action portrayals compared to the
animated reconstructions (Figure 2B, Table 1). While these
areas were engaged by the presentation of cartoon characters,
in line with previous research, the STS and TPJ are clearly
more engaged when participants view live-action agents
(Figure 2C). Another brain region associated with social-
cognitive processing, the right middle frontal gyrus (MFG),
was also more active during live-action portrayals of social
interaction (See Table 1).
Split-half reliability analysis
A formal replication analysis was conducted in order to test
the reliability of these results for the STS and TPJ. Data for
each participant was split into two separate data sets:
a hypothesis-generating data set and a hypothesis-testing
data set. Each set represented the viewing of equivalent video
content but was mirrored in presentation format (i.e. video
segments that were real in the first data set were animated in
the second data set and vice versa). Regions of interest were
defined based on peak activations in the STS and TPJ from
the hypothesis-generating data set for the Real >Animated
contrast [all significant voxels (P< 0.01) within 8mm of the
peak]. This analysis identified activations in the right STS
(60, 42, 6; 51, 24, 6) and TPJ (54, 63, 12). Activations
in these locations were then formally tested for replication in
the hypothesis-testing data set. For each participant,
parameter estimates of signal change for each region were
computed, averaged and submitted to a one-sample t-test
(H0¼ 0). Both activations replicated in the hypothesis-
testing data set, for the STS (P< 0.001), and TPJ (P< 0.05),
heightening our confidence in the reliability of this result.
Brain regions more sensitive to cartoon than
live-action agents
The reverse contrast, examining greater activations for
perceiving cartoon agents relative to live-action actors
(Animated >Real), failed to reveal a response in any area
characteristically associated with mentalizing. Instead,
activations were observed in the ventrolateral occipitotem-
poral cortex (including the fusiform gyrus) extending
dorsally up to the lateral occipital cortex, intraparietal
sulci, and premotor and somatosensory cortices (Table 2).
DISCUSSION
A number of areas that were preferentially activated by
live-action portrayals of social agents have been implicated
in research on biological motion and mental inference.
Some of the conclusions drawn by these previous studies,
however, bear closer examination in light of the findings
reported herein.
Lateral temporal areas and intentional motion
The STS and TPJ have previously been implicated in both
the detection of biological motion (Beauchamp et al., 2002)
and the process of mental state attribution (Frith and Frith,
1999; Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Pelphrey and colleagues
(2003a), for example, have demonstrated that the right
STS is preferentially involved when biological motion is
presented, but not for non-biological but coherent and
meaningful movements. In this case, biological motion was
operationalized in two ways, as a computer-generated person
walking in profile, or a ‘robot’ that moved identically,
Table 1 Brain regions more associated with live-action depictions relative to
animated depictions of action
Region BA x y z # Voxels Peak
Z-Score
R STS 21/22 56 35 5 87 4.23
53 21 4 3.73
53 12 12 3.72
R TPJ 39 50 63 20 10 3.75
R MFG 8/9 24 40 37 11 3.75
B mOCC (Lingual gyrus) 17/18 9 76 4 1303 5.53
(Lingual gyrus) 17/18 9 73 4 5.22
(Cuneus) 18/19 12 74 26 4.92
R cuneus 17/18 24 55 14 40 3.89
B mOCP 18 0 88 13 6 3.71
PCC 23/31 0 45 30 105 4.16
(R precuneus) 7 3 44 49 3.96
(L precuneus) 7/31 6 47 47 3.46
L PCC 23 12 48 33 5 3.49
R precuneus 7 3 58 61 55 3.85
L precuneus 7 9 67 61 5 3.45
B THL 3 26 10 19 4.03
L CAUD 15 2 17 20 4.02
L SCB 18 44 10 12 4.02
Threshold P< 0.0005 (uncorrected), extent threshold¼ 5 voxels; coordinates follow
atlas by Talairach and Tournoux (1988); BA, Brodmann area; STS, superior temporal
sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; mOCC, medial
occipital cortex; mOCP, medial occipital pole; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; THL,
Thalamus; CAUD, caudate; SCB, superior cerebellum. A slightly higher than traditional
threshold was employed since at P< 0.001 medial occipital activations obscured
unique medial parietal peaks. At P< 0.001, activations are present in the L STS
(50, 72, 2; k¼ 18; Z¼ 3.70), L TPJ (48, 60, 12; k¼ 6; Z¼ 3.42), left
posterior dorsomedial frontal cortex (3, 3, 50; k¼ 8; Z¼ 3.37), and bilateral
posterior cerebellum (3, 83, 26; k¼ 6; Z¼ 3.30).
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composed of cylinders and spheres. These researchers found
that the STS did not discriminate between these two
presentations, leading them to conclude that this area is
sensitive to biological motion but not the surface features
of a moving object. While our own results appear to
contradict their conclusion, this divergence may be
explained by differences in stimuli. The computer-generated
animations employed by Pelphrey and colleagues (2003a)
were clearly not accurate representations of a real intentional
human, in contrast to the actors in our live-action segments.
The STS may thus be preferentially activated by representa-
tions of social agents that closely approximate the real-world,
while responding less to all cartoon and unrealistic
representations, perhaps equally (cf. Perani et al., 2001).
By examining other aspects of biological motion, such as
shifts in gaze (Pelphrey et al., 2003b; cf. Pelphrey et al.,
2004b) and reaching movements (Pelphrey et al., 2004a),
Pelphrey and his colleagues have concluded that the STS not
only codes for biological motion, but it appears to be most
involved when decoding the intentions behind actions. Saxe
and colleagues (2004) have reported a similar conclusion,
showing that with biological motion held constant, the STS
is more engaged when this motion implies the operation of
intention or motivation. It seems plausible, then, that the
current findings demonstrate that our brains perceive
biological motion enacted by real people as more intentional
in flavor.
In sum, previous research has shown that the STS and
TPJ are active during the presentation of articulated motion
(Beauchamp et al., 2002; Beauchamp et al., 2003), and for
very abstract representations of intentional action such as
moving shapes (Allison et al., 2000; Beauchamp et al., 2003;
Shultz et al., 2004), leading some to conclude that form is
irrelevant for processing biological motion (Pelphrey et al.,
2003a) and in mentalizing (Shultz et al., 2004). Here we
show, however, that these temporal social perception areas
are most responsive when subjects view real people
compared to viewing animated cartoon characters.
Right middle frontal gyrus and mentalizing
The right MFG, also more sensitive to live-action relative to
cartoon agents, has been implicated in a number of studies
that pertain to mentalizing and perceptions of agency.
Blakemore and colleagues (2003) observed that this area
was only engaged when attention was explicitly directed
(via task-instructions) toward the contingent relationships
between moving shapes, and thus concluded that it plays
a top-down role in social perception. Congruent with this
idea, the right MFG is more active when people are explicitly
asked to make judgments about persons as opposed to dogs
(Mason et al., 2004), or when instructed to make mental
inferences based upon a person’s eye-region (Platek et al.,
2004). This area has also been activated in a study on
decoding intentionality that lacked task instructions
(Pelphrey et al., 2004a), as did the current investigation.
Preferential activity in this area may thus provide evidence
that greater explicit mentalizing, or perceptions of inten-
tionality, spontaneously occurred when participants were
viewing the live-action actors.
Medial parietal regions and mentalizing
Medial parietal areas, such as the precuneus and posterior
cingulate also exhibited a greater BOLD response to the live-
action actors compared to the cartoon agents. These regions
have often been implicated in studies of social cognition and
mentalizing (Saxe and Wexler, 2005). A number of studies
have found preferential involvement of this region when
taking another’s perspective (Ruby and Decety, 2001;
Jackson et al., 2006), perhaps especially with respect to
their thoughts rather than bodily sensations like hunger
(Saxe and Powell, 2006). It is also involved when making
judgments regarding the self (Johnson et al., 2002) and
appears to be involved in the processing of emotions
(Ochsner et al., 2004), possibly social emotions in particular
(Britton et al., 2006). Thus, its preferential engagement
during the presentation of live-action social agents relative to
cartoon agents supports our claim that social processing
brain areas are especially tuned to realistic representations
of conspecifics. However, the precuneus is also known to be
involved in the encoding of spatial relations (Frings et al.,
2006) and its greater response for live-action segments might
Table 2 Brain regions more associated with animated depictions relative to
live-action depictions of action
Region BA x y z # Voxels Peak
Z-Score
L VLOCC 18/19, 37 33 90 7 1385 5.67
30 92 24 5.66
33 82 9 5.50
R VLOCC 18/19, 37 39 88 3 1686 5.47
33 87 10 5.29
30 83 24 5.21
R anterior IFG 10 53 38 1 34 4.38
56 43 7 3.87
L IPS 7 27 61 53 71 4.35
33 50 49 3.43
R PMC 44 48 13 19 121 4.31
9 53 13 27 4.12
6/8 59 14 38 3.55
R OFC 11 24 40 20 14 4.28
L PMC 6/8 48 1 28 6 3.91
L OFC 11 36 48 23 9 3.76
R SFG 6 33 0 55 7 3.64
R inferior PoCG 2 48 30 35 8 3.58
R superior PoCG 3 53 18 56 7 3.44
Threshold P< 0.0005 (uncorrected), extent threshold¼ 5 voxels; coordinates follow
atlas by Talairach and Tournoux (1988); BA, Brodmann area; VLOCC, ventrolateral
occipital cortex; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; PMC, premotor
cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; PoCG, post-central gyrus;
extends to R IPS, (36, 59, 53, Z¼ 4.77). At P< 0.001, no additional activations
are revealed.
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also reflect either more, or more realistic, spatial information
for these stimuli (e.g. depth perspective).
Spontaneous social perception and solicited social
judgments
An overlap exists between the network of brain areas we
observed during the spontaneous adoption of the intentional
stance and those normally associated with explicit social
judgments (Frith and Frith, 2003). Saxe (2006) has argued
that the TPJ supports reasoning about mental states
(Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). If this is true, here we show
that mentalizing processes implicitly and spontaneously
engaged are neurally instantiated in similar ways to explicitly
solicited mental inferences. German and colleagues (2004)
have published corroborating data, demonstrating that
displays of pretense evoke activation in social brain areas
without instructions to engage in mentalizing. This finding
demonstrates that the activations found by previous
researchers are not simply the result of instructions directing
participants to engage in mentalizing tasks, but that these
regions of the brain are also employed when individuals
infer mental states in a natural, non-directed and more
ecologically valid manner.
Other brain regions more associated with
live-action actors
The live-action footage resulted in more BOLD activation
throughout visual-processing areas (e.g. medial occipital
cortex, lingual gyrus, cuneus) and subcortical sensory
pathways (e.g. caudate, thalamus). These early visual areas
are sensitive to cues of perceptual depth (Backus et al., 2001),
and the live-action footage certainly presented more such
information compared to the cartoon segments, which
appeared somewhat flat in comparison. Subcortical sensory
pathways may have been more activated by the greater
information contained within the live-action video
segments.
Brain regions associated with cartoon actors
A number of the activations preferentially engaged by
cartoon agents have been found to prefer non-human
(e.g. tool) motion over biological motion, or fail to
discriminate between such stimuli, such as the premotor
cortices and intraparietal sulci (Beauchamp et al., 2002,
2003; Pelphrey et al., 2003a). The superior frontal gyrus
activation witnessed during this contrast was rather caudally
located, and is best described as belonging to part of
the former structure. Greater activation in ventrolateral
occipitotemporal visual areas (e.g. fusiform gyrus) were
likely due to the fact that the cartoon segments contained far
brighter colors (Beauchamp et al., 1999). These activations
extended along the lateral surface of the occipital cortex, into
areas of the brain that have been associated with subjective
percepts, specifically of objects and shapes (Grill-Spector and
Malach, 2004), possibly indicating that more effort was
required to parse the cartoon presentations into recogniz-
able objects. Perhaps the most interesting activations
for this contrast were in the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex.
This region is most often associated with reward, with
the anterior portion responding to even quite abstract
reinforcers such as music (Kringelbach, 2005). Our own
activations in this region correspond to the anterior
orbitofrontal cortex, and may indicate that the cartoon
stimuli were viewed as more novel and thus more rewarding.
Possible confounds
A possible weakness in the design of this study is that the
BOLD differences observed could be the result of other,
more superficial, differences between the cartoon and live-
action video. Although biological motion was controlled
across conditions, the two types of stimuli did differ along
some other visual dimensions and perhaps these differences
can account for the preferential activations observed, rather
than the perception of these stimuli as either cartoon or
realistic. Mentalizing brain areas have not previously been
shown to respond to simple visual manipulations such as
depth, brightness and contrast, however (Grill-Spector and
Malach, 2004). Future investigations employing a parametric
or factorial design would clarify this issue.
CONCLUSION
Utilizing a set of unique stimuli, we have shown that areas of
the brain associated with social perception and mentalizing
(rSTS, rTPJ, rMFG) are preferentially responsive to live-
action portrayals of human action, even in the absence
of explicit mentalizing instructions. Thus, while a range of
moving stimuli can trigger the implementation of the
intentional stance, this mindset is most successfully activated
when biological motion is generated by another person.
The neural system that supports mentalizing thus appears to
be finely tuned to an agentic understanding of real human
movements. Moreover, our data show that the intentional
stance, spontaneously engaged without explicit instructions,
involves a network of brain areas similar to that which
supports overt social judgments.
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